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Is tax competition necessarily a Race to the bottom?  
Optimal tax rate trajectories in the model of tax competition for 
different objective functions 
Abstarct 
The work is devoted research of government tax behaviour in tax competition 
conditions. In details we study followed issues: is necessarily tax competition lead to 
Race to the bottom & is possible a simultaneous optimum of tax rate for both 
economies? This work is continuation of research about, is it necessarily Race to the 
bottom is Prisoner’s dilemma. Available studies of tax competition generally focus on 
the analysis, which countries are inherent the trend to tax rate decrease, can this trend 
be considered a Race to the bottom, but if not, what are the reasons, that a Race to the 
bottom is not observed? 
The difference of the proposed work is that we do not consider additional, though 
important factors. The optimization model of tax competition for 2 economies evidence 
that even for one factor – the generalized tax burden, without the separation of income 
tax and “compensatory” taxes, such as taxes on consumption, labor, environment – a 
Race to the bottom is not necessarily. Under different conditions the trend can be 
directed as to decrease as to increase of tax rate. 
So, it can be argued that tax competition not necessarily leads to Race to the 
bottom, as well as Race to the bottom is not necessarily modeled by Prisoner’s 
dilemma. The obtained results can help understand why some countries do not always 
follow the general trend to tax rate decrease. In addition, it explains not always the 
optimal tax behavior of some countries those in this way cause a change in the trend in 
competitors. 
Key words: tax competition; race to the bottom; prisoner’s dilemma; tax rate 
trajectory; modelling 
Introduction 
The text is the continue of (Sokolovskyi, 2020) 
The purpose of the previous work was to establish, whether Race to the bottom 
is always Prisoner’s dilemma, as it considers by basic models of this process (see i.e. 
Polanyi (1944), pp. 57, 73, Schlesinger (1997), Kuttner (1997), Tonelson (2000), p. 15, 
Greider (2001)). There’re applied researches that have tested this hypothesis but not 
always supported it. (see, (Mendoza, Tesar, 2003a), (Mendoza, Tesar, 2003b), (Abbas, 
Klemm, 2013), (Revilla, 2016), Kiefer, Rada (2013a, 2013b), (Rota-Graziosi, 2019)). 
A number of researchers (Wheeler (2001), Spar (1998), Jensen (2006), Rodric (1999), 
Cho (2002), Dean (1992), Jaffe at al. (1995), Tobey (1990), Ratnayake (1998), 
Trandafir, Brezeanu & Stanciu (2011)) emphasize that application of the main quality 
of Race to the bottom, namely the mutual (collective) reduction of the tax rate by 
economies does not necessarily lead to deterioration of labor, social, and/or 
environmental standards, i.e. to Prisoner’s dilemma. 
In (Sokolovskyi, 2020) modelling the interaction of 2 economies using game 
theory for different cases of the objective functions (namely the investment volume, 
the budget revenue, and the budget revenue + the investment volume) also confirms 
that Race to the bottom does not always led to Prisoner’s dilemma, so optimums and 
equilibriums are not always got when applying pure strategies at end-points. It is 
established that Race to the bottom leads the presence or absence of Prisoner’s dilemma 
not for sure; it is determined by the specific values of the interaction parameters. 
It’s also known that even with a pretty simple objective function “budget 
revenue” its maximum is usually got not at the maximum tax burden (=1), but in the 
middle of the interval (0; 1) (Laffer, 2004). So, when the government decrease the tax 
burden in the economy, it does not necessarily worsen the financial situation of the 
economy, even without taking into account the additional investment inflow. It’s also 
contrary to logic Prisoner’s dilemma. 
In addition, observations (Mendoza, Tesar, 2005) show that during tax 
competition countries do not reduce rates to a minimum but find some intermediate 
optimal burden. 
Literature review 
The question of optimal taxation has been raised since F. P. Ramsey (Ramsey, 
1927). Among later studies, one of the defining works is the article Diamond & 
Mirrlees (1971). 
In general, the authors present tax optimization, first of all, as improving the 
structure of taxes, balancing different types of taxes, in particular, the ratio of direct 
and indirect taxes, the logic of establishing the tax burden. 
From this perspective, it is worth noting the works of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976 
Atkinson (1977), Kaplow (2008). 
Tax regulation as a way of economic behavior raises the issue of tax rates size, 
as well as changes ones in order to reduce the shadow segment of the economy, 
intensify economic activity and attract investment. 
Limit tax rates were calculated by Mirrlees (1971) based on the balancing of 
equality and efficiency. 
In that direction, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) used the Ramsey model 
(Ramsey, 1928) to analyze the optimality of a non-zero capital tax. 
Capital gains taxation is the subject of research in the works of Mankiw (2000), 
Kones, Kitao, and Kruger (2009), Aiyagari (1994). 
Related to these studies are the investigations of Kaplow (1990), Tuomala 
(1990), Sandmo (1993), Cremer & Gahvari (1993), Slemrod (1994, 2001), Diamond 
(1998), Saez (2001), Weinzierl (2009). 
In particular, L. Kaplow analyzes the relationship between optimal taxation and 
optimal tax enforcement. The based question is which revenue should be raised through 
higher tax rates. 
Cremer H. & Gahvari F. consider tax evasion because of Ramsey’s optimal 
taxation problem. 
Slemrod J. (1994) calculus optimal income tax progressivity and generalizes the 
standard model of the optimal linear income tax to include taxpayer avoidance behavior 
and the ability to higher marginal tax rates. 
In the work of 2001 Slemrod summarizes the standard model of how taxes affect 
the labor-leisure choice. This model provides a conceptual structure for evaluating to 
what extent, and in what situations, the opportunities for tax avoidance mitigate the 
real substitution response to taxation. 
The attractiveness of the economy by regulating tax rates can be increased both 
on an absolute scale, by improving the economic climate in the jurisdiction (in 
particular, by the tax burden optimizing), and relative to other economies, in 
competition with them. 
Actually, international tax competition is another direction of researches of the 
area of the optimal taxation. By this concept we mean the use by governments of low 
tax rates to improve the attraction of their countries and, consequently, to attract 
additional investment. 
A review of the theory of international tax competition see by Keen & Konrad 
(2013). Authors in particular analyze factors affect the choice by governments their 
international tax behavior. 
M. Devereux, B. Lockwood, M. Redoano & S. Loretz study the possible tax 
competition about corporate income taxes in OECD countries (Devereux et al., 2008) 
and European Union countries (Devereux & Loretz, 2013). They concluded that some 
features of tax competition typical generally for the EU countries. 
These models consider a proposition that market share of certain jurisdiction is 
inversely related both to its tax rate and allocative efficiency (Lee, 2009, p.20). 
One of the known research models of tax competition that explains the 
decreasing trend of the tax burden is Race to the bottom proper. 
The analysis of presence or absence Race to the bottom for different regions is 
contained in the works Krogstrup (2004), Dvořáková (2013), Nicodème (2006) (all – 
the European Union), Vezinz (2014) (Asia). 
Moreover, Nicodème (2006) denies Race to the bottom. 
Krogstrup (2004) notes some effect of tax competition on the corporate tax 
burden, however its amount is not enough to confirm for Race to the bottom. 
Dvořáková (2013) fixes decreasing of corporate income tax in EU countries, 
moreover, the analysis let assume the presence of Race to the bottom for new members 
(EU-12) but does not confirm for old members (EU-15). 
Ali Abbas et al. (2012) found evidence of a partial race to the bottom, notably, 
no race to the bottom situation for standard tax systems in the sample compared to 
advanced economies and the presence of race to the bottom for special tax regimes, 
where effective tax rates are close to zero. 
Drezner (2006) identified the main forecasts for Race to the bottom in terms of 
regulatory standards: if some government reduces its regulatory standards to attract 
more investment, other open economies, according to the model Race to the bottom, 
must follow the same tax behavior to prevent capital flight. 
Based on these studies and the model (Sokolovskyi, 2020) we're going to test the 
hypothesis if may the government's strategy in terms of tax competition be different 
from the Race to the bottom, even if we do not consider additional related tax factors 
except for generalized tax burden, such as taxes on consumption, labor, environment. 
So, observations of the real economy evidence that tax competition does not 
always lead to a Race to the bottom. Moreover, competitors are affected by many 
factors other than income tax: taxes on labor, the environment or consumption, and 
various externalities that can distort the result. Therefore, there’s the task to check, if a 
Race to the bottom is a consequence of tax competition in perfect pure conditions, 
without obstacles, or, conversely, the optionality of a Race to the bottom follows from 
the competition model itself. 
Namely, when considering the single tax model, we are interested in 
✓ if governments always only try to decrease tax burden? 
✓ even in this case, do government tries to decrease the tax rate reduction up to 0? 
✓ if not, what are the causes and consequences; does this correspond to the real 
situation? 
Therefore, we’re going to look for the players’ tax strategies (the optimal tax 
rate), that maximize their objective functions, depending on the opponent's actions (for 
different objective functions). 
We’re also going to test that there is a point of mutual equilibrium at which the 
objective functions of both players get the maximum and, if not, determine to what 
results interact between economies may lead when they try to optimize their tax rates, 
based on the current tax rate of vis-à-vis. 
Methods and models 
We model the interaction of 2 economies with parametrically set values of 
economic productivity. It's assumed that economies are in a state of tax and investment 
equilibrium, i.e. a state in which all economies are the same for the potential investor 
in terms of productivity of investments and therefore no investment movement takes 
place between these economies. 
To determine the dependence of economic productivity on the volume of 
investment there uses the exponential function. (We assume with increasing investment 
(investment saturation), their efficiency per unit decreases.) A sigmoid function also 
can be used for it, but in the work, we do not perform calculations for this type of 
function. 
To solve the issue, we calculate the extremums of functions 1 and 2 of variables 
prescribed in implicit form and limited to an interval (0; 1), since the independent 
variables of these functions are tax rates. 
When using the exponential dependence of the profitability of the economy on 
the volume of available investment per unit, as well as the assumption that investment 
is distributed only between the two economies, the profitability of the economies i and 
j are equal to: 
i i ia x
ip e
−= ; 
( )1j j ia x
jp e





e  – multipliers, in accordance, for economies i and j, 1iae  , 1jae  , or, 
what is the same, 0ia  , 0ja  . Since the situation for economies i and j is 
symmetric, we consider the economy i is no less productive than the economy 
j, i.e. i ja a . 
i, j – the speed of decrease in profitability depending on the saturation of the 
economy with investment, in accordance, for economies i and j, i>0, j>0. 
When taxing pi and pj in the volume, in accordance, i and j we get: 
( )1 i i ia xi ip e  −= − ; 
( ) ( )11 j j ia xj jp e  − −= − . 
The investment equilibrium is got for the distribution of investments ( )ˆ ˆ; 1i ix x− , when 
i jp p= , i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( )11 1 j j ii i i a xa xi je e   − −−− = − ; 
( )11
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It’s economically advisable to consider 3 based goals, that the government 
strives to reach: maximizing the revenue from investments in total; maximizing the 
budget revenue; maximizing the budget revenue, and the revenue from investments in 
total. 
Maximizing the revenue from investments in total as the objective function 
The total volume on all investments in economies i and j is: 
( )1 i i ia xi i iP x e  −= − ; 
( )( ) ( )11 1 j j ia xj i jP x e  − −= − − . 
For the state of investment equilibrium, it’s equal to: 
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; (3) 
Maximizing the budget revenue from the taxation of investment income as 
the objective function 
If the total investment volume in the economy i is ( )1 i i ia xi i iP x e  −= − , then 
the volume of budget revenue for the economy i is 
i i ia x
i i iB x e
 −= . 
In accordance for the economy j: 
( ) ( )11 j j ia xj i jB x e
 − −= − . 





































































+ −  
−  




















































 +  
 
  − 
−
 −
= + − + −  −+  
; (4) 
( )









































  − 
−
 −
= − + − −  −+  
. (4’) 
Maximizing the total revenue of investors and the government as the 
objective function 
Total income of investors and the government in the economy i (Ri) are: 
( )1 i i i i i i i i ia x a x a xi i i i i i i iR P B x e x e x e   − − −= + = − + = . 
Respectively, in the economy j: 
( ) ( )11 j j ia xj iR x e
− −= − . 
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−
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= + − + −  −+  
. (5) 
Since expressions (1) and (2) for economies i and j are symmetric, for the 
economy j is true 
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−
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= − + − −  −+  
. (5’) 
Analysis of the extrema of the above functions allows us to determine their 
parametric maxima for i and j and to assess the possibility of simultaneously 
achieving optimal values in both economies. In the absence of such a possibility, we 
can simulate the alternate behavior of 2 players, aimed at maximizing their winnings 
at each step for different ratios of the parameters of the objective functions. 
Results 
Let's find the extrema of each of the objective functions for i and j. 
Maximizing the investment volume as the objective function 
































































− , ( )ln 1 i− , so 
( ) ( )ln 1 ln 1j i j j ia a  + − − − + −  increase when I decreases. Thus îP  increases 
when i increases too. The maximum of îP
 
is achieved at i=0 and is equal to 
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the maximum of ˆjP  is achieved at j=0 and is equal to 
( )
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. 
In fact, these results are definitely obvious: other factors being equal, the 
maximum investment comes to the economy at zero tax burden. 
However, the government's interest is not only in increasing investments but also 
in tax revenues to the budget. 
Maximizing the budget revenue as the objective function 
The objective functions for 2 economies like (4) & (4’). Let’s find the derivatives 
of ˆiB  and ˆ jB  (see Appendix A): 
( ) ( ) ( )
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=  = − −    (7’) 
The calculation of the second-order derivatives (see Appendix A) indicates the 
obtained extrema are maxima. 
Maximizing the total revenue of investors and the government as the 
objective function 
The objective functions for 2 economies like 5) & (5’). Let's find the derivatives 
of ˆiR  and ˆ jR  (see Appendix A): 
( ) ( )
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=  = − − ,    (9) 
respectively, 
( ) ( )







































































− − + −
=  = − − .  (9’) 
The calculation of the second-order derivatives (see Appendix A) indicates the 
obtained extrema are maxima. 
The conditions (9) & (9’) are completely the same as (7) & (7’). So, the 
conditions of maxima are the same for maximizing the budget revenue and maximizing 
the budget revenue & the investment volume as the objective functions. Then below 
we refer only to (7) & (7’), though the analysis and conclusions hold for both these 
cases. 
Verification for the possibility of simultaneous achievement of the optimal 
tax rate by both players 
Actually, it means verification of the presence of tax rates pair ( );i j   that are 
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 
. (10) 
In economic view the case i =j=1 is almost impossible. If i , j<1, then given 
(8), simultaneous achieving of the optimum for both economies does not depend on tax 
rate and is possible only for certain values of mutually independent parameters i and 
j, which are not directly regulated by the government. The parameters of the 
functioning of any economy are volatile, so stable fulfillment of the condition (10) is 
almost unattainable. It means that the simultaneous achievement of the optimal tax rate 
by both economies is almost unrealistic. 
The dependences of the optimal values i  on j and j  on i are linear (see (7) & 
(7’)). Their properties are as follows: 
✓ the cross point for 2 graphs is (1; 1); 
✓ thus, there’s no extremum for 2 players at one time; 
Let's analyze the graphs of parametric optima for i and j, that illustrate the 
equations (7) & (7’). Based (7) & (7’) can be written: 
( )
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ1 1 1
j j j
j i j j i j j i j
i i i
a a a a a a
j i ie e e
  
  
    
+ − − − + − − − + − − −
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j j j
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j i ie e e
  
  
    
− + − + + − + − + + − + − + +
= − − = − + .(12) 
The mutual location of the corresponding lines j(i) is determined by the ratio 
of parameters i and j. The line for parametric optimal values of i , is above the line 
for parametric optimal values of j, if the coefficient at î   in (11) is less than the 
coefficient at i in (12), i.e., 
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+  , the line for parametric optimal values of i , is above the line for 





+  , the line for parametric optimal values of i , is under the line for 
parametric optimal values of j (fig. 1b). 
 










































































+   
It should be noted the symmetry of the above formulas, i.e., it does not matter in 
which of the economies the return falls faster, but there’s important the sum of inverse 
values of returns. 
For each of the 2 cases the lines of parametric optimums can intersect X-axis at 
points greater than 0, less than 0, or either one of them at a point greater than 0 and 
other one at a point less than 0. 
Since, in fact, both players cannot reach the optimum tax rate at the same time, 
thus it’s relevant to consider step-by-step alternate player’s behaviour for optimizing 
their own tax burden. 
The scenario of players' interaction is aimed at optimizing tax rate is as follows: 




Step 1: The player j calculates his tax rate value ( 1
j





Step 2: The player i calculates his tax rate value (
1
i
 ) as the optimum relative to 
( 1
j
 ), etc. 
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 = − − .    (14) 
The condition of decreasing or increasing the optimal tax rate in the process of 
step-by-step optimization behavior is as follows: 
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+   and the line for parametric optimal values of i is under the line for 
for parametric optimal values of j, above government’s behaviour leads to 





+   and the line for parametric optimal values of i is over the line for 
for parametric optimal values of j, above government’s behaviour leads to 
monotonic increasing of their economy’s tax rate (Fig. 2b). 
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+   
2 variants of players’ behaviour, depending on location of optimal lines for i 
and j: as it can see from fig. 2b, such acts lead or to a fixed decreasing tax rates until 
the tax rate of one of them becomes zero, or to fixed increasing tax rates until the rates 
of both players converge in the point (1; 1). 
As a result, there're possible such cases of the mutual location the maximum 





+  , the optimizing of players' step-by-step strategy leads to increasing tax 





+  , the optimizing of players’ step-by-step strategy leads to decreasing tax 
rates in both economies, moreover there’re possible 3 cases of the mutual location 
the maximum lines for i and j: 
✓ both lines for parametric optimal values of j and j intersect Y-axis at points 
greater than 0; 
✓ the line for parametric optimal values of j intersects Y-axis at points greater than 
0, and the line for parametric optimal values of i, intersect Y-axis at points less 
than 0; 
✓ both lines for parametric optimal values of i  and j intersect Y-axis at points less 
than 0. 
The abscissas of intersection points X-axis the lines for parametric optima of i 
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For decreasing trend of tax rates j from (11) is less than j from (12), and the 
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In case 2, the decreasing trend eventually leads both economies to zero tax rates 
(see fig. 2a). In case 1, the sequence of players’ actions definitely leads to such limit 
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= − =  (fig. 3a, b). 
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Discussion 
The obtained results mark some main peculiar features of the model of tax 
competition of 2 economies. 
We consider 3 objective functions: maximizing the investment, maximizing the 
budget revenue and maximizing the total revenue of investors and the government. 
Clearly, they’re based on 2 factors: the investment revenue and the tax budget revenue: 
the first function maximizes the first factor, the second function maximizes the second 
factor, and the third one maximizes the sum of the first and second factors. The results 
for the first function are trivial, and the results for the second and third functions, 
despite some differences in the form of these objective functions, are completely 
identical. It allows for the conclusion that the main factor determining government tax 
behavior, is maximization the budget revenue from investments. 
Moreover, we observe the following properties of government tax behavior 
under competitive conditions: 
✓ in fact, both players cannot reach the optimum tax rate on the interval (0; 1) at the 
same time; 
✓ on step-by-step alternate optimization, there are 2 trends: decreasing and increasing 
of tax rates; 
✓ the trend direction is dependent on the mutual location of optimal lines of 2 players; 
✓ in turn, the mutual location of optimal lines is not dependent on individual 
parameters, but only on their composition. 
One of the questions that this study had to answer is if tax competition of 
economies is described by Prisoner’s dilemma model? 
The above model of the successive optimization tax rates of 2 economies differs 
from the model of Prisoner’s dilemma by 2 key points. 
Firstly, depending on parameters of interaction the step-by-step optimization of 
tax rates can lead not only to minimize but to maximize ones, while tax competition 
like Prisoner's dilemma leads only to decreasing tax rates. 
Second, in contrast to Prisoner’s dilemma, a trend change is possible not only 
due to concerted acts (cooperation) of players but by the efforts of one of them this 
way. If one of the players sets the tax rate above the optimal value, while the other 
optimizes his tax rate, it reverses the trend towards a step-by-step increase in tax rates. 
I.e., there's also the possibility of an uncoordinated behavior of one of the players, that 
predisposes the other to decrease or increase his tax rate. 
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Fig. 4. The step-by-step alternative to players' behavior using non- 
incentivizing strategy by one player 
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So, the above model of an interaction of the 2 economies let reach the trend 
change by the efforts of one of the interacting parties, provided that the other one tries 
to act optimally at each step. I.e., if one of the players uses maximizing strategy, the 
other player can change the trend direct without its contractor’s consent. 
At the same time, each of the two players is available to change the trend only 
in one direction: one of them – from decreasing tax rate to increasing one; the other, 
conversely, from increasing tax rate to decreasing. 
So, we can state the competition of 2 (or more) economies does not always take 
the form of Race to the bottom. However, even in the case of Race to the bottom 
synchronous decreasing tax rates do not necessarily lead to their mutual zeroing. Put it 
differently Race to the bottom is a particular case of competition of economies, and 
Prisoner’s dilemma is a particular case of Race to the bottom. 
Also note that the distribution of the above roles of players in no way depends 
on the efficiency of economies, but only on the sum of the parameters of the economic 
environment of 2 countries. It should be noted the symmetry of the above formulas, 
i.e., it does not matter, the profitability of which of the economies falls more quickly, 
the total value of the inverse values is important. 
A lot of researches have shown the decisions of economies’ governments do not 
always fit into the framework of classical maximizing behavior. In particular, it applies 
to researches on the issue of, can we classify the behavior of countries (and which 
exactly) as Race to the bottom, or the issue of the availability and character of the 
relationship between macroeconomic indicators and the dynamics of tax rates 
(Sokolovskiy, 2018; Sokolovskiy, 2019). 
The above properties of the optimization government behavior in the interaction 
of economies show it does not necessarily fit into the framework of Race to the bottom. 
Governments can locally use non-optimal solutions to solving the strategic 
maximization task too. So, some non-optimization steps of a subject do not always 
indicate his in general non-optimization behavior. The selection of additional factors 
for such an analysis needs additional research. 
Conclusion 
We researched the issue of tax rate optimization competition of two economies 
for better investment conditions. In this context, we studied questions and hypotheses 
if it is necessarily such a competition is Race to the bottom and if it is modeled by 
Prisoner’s dilemma. 
1. On researching the issue of the optimal tax rate, we consider 3 the objective 
functions by that the government is ruled in its behavior: 
✓ maximizing the investment volume, 
✓ maximizing the budget revenue, and 
✓ maximizing the budget revenue and the investment volume. 
2. The optimal tax behaviour for the objective function “Maximizing the 
investment volume” is clearly. 
The objective functions for both economies reach their maximums at non-zero 
tax rates, which is quite clear: all other things being equal, maximal investment comes 
to the economy at zero tax burden. 
However, the government is interested not only in increasing investments but 
also in tax revenues. 
3. For the objective function “maximizing the budget revenue” and “maximizing 
the budget revenue and the investment volume” 
✓ there’s exactly one extreme point in the interval of tax rate (0; 1) for each of the 
economies, that’s depended on the current tax rate in another economy ( )î j   and 
( )ˆ j i  , and this extremum is the maximum; 
✓ simultaneous achieving of the optimum for both economies is impossible in fact, 
because it formally depends on the changeable unregulated parameters of the 
economic environment, i.e. is unstable and unmanageable. 
4. For both objective functions: “maximizing the budget revenue” and 
“maximizing the budget revenue and the investment volume” the step-by-step alternate 
behavior, when each player optimizes his tax rate, based tax rate of the other player, 
can lead to both maximally possible decrease tax rate in both economies and maximal 
increase ones. Moreover, the trend direction depends on the ratio of the graphs of the 
optimal values of tax rate both economies. 
5. Depending on the parameters of the economy tax rate decreasing trend (for 
both above objective functions) can lead to 3 limit pairs: ( )ˆ ˆ0; 0i j =  , 
( )ˆ ˆ0; 0i j = =  and ( )ˆ ˆ0; 0i j  = . The tax rate increasing trend leads to a unique 
limit pair ( )ˆ ˆ1; 1i j = = . 
6. Competition between economies for investment attractiveness by setting 
optimal tax rate is not the model of Prisoner’s dilemma and differs from it by two 
factors: 
✓ under certain conditions, the best strategies for governments are not decreasing but 
increasing tax rate; 
✓ player cooperation is not critical to achieving optimal values of objective functions; 
to reverse the trend there's enough purposeful non-optimization behavior of one of 
the players on condition of optimization behavior of the other; 
✓ moreover, one of the players can change the tax rate decreasing trend to increasing 
one; another player, conversely, can change the tax rate increasing trend to 
decreasing one. 
So, Race to the bottom is a special case of competition of economies, and 
Prisoner’s dilemma is a special case of Race to the bottom. 
7. Above model shows the governments can consciously make tactical non-
optimal decisions about current tax rates to cause a reversal of the trend. So, more 
powerful economies have more opportunities to vary their tax rates. The logic of such 
actions, the reaction to them, and the possible consequences and results can be the 
subject of future studies. 
Also needs to be studied issue of why even when applying Race to the bottom in 
fact governments do not reach the limit and do not decrease tax rate to 0. I.e. what’re 
the reasons and factors stopping the rally. The same is true about tax rate increasing 
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